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FIDUCIARY LIABILITY UNDER THE
FEDERAL PRIORITY STATUTES
ROBERT N. DAvIEs*
Myriad aspects of commercial interaction between the federal gov-
ernment and individuals may be affected by the near-ancient sec-
tions 3466 and 3467 of the Revised Statutes which subject a fiduci-
ary of an insolvent estate to personal liability for failure to grant
priority to specified governmental claims. In an attempt to guide
the practitioner through the maze of contingencies presented by
these provisions, the author outlines considerations relevant to an
assessment of the applicability and effect of the statutory priorities.
UDGES and legislators have not been hesitant in placing extraor-
dinary duties upon those individuals deemed worthy of the title
"fiduciary." One of the greatest, yet least familiar, of these duties is
that imposed by sections 3466 and 3467 of the Revised Statutes.'
Under section 3467, "every executor, administrator, . . . assignee, or
other person" who pays any debts of the estate or person represented
by him without first satisfying all debts owing the United States,
as required by section 3466,2 is personally liable to the United States
"to the extent of such payments... or for so much thereof as may
remain due and unpaid."3  Enacted in the latter portion of the
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131 U.S.C. §§ 191-92 (1964).
This section provides: "Whenever any person indebted to the United States is
insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors
or administrators, is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts
due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend
as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts,
makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an
absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases
in which an act of bankruptcy is committed." This statute, giving the federal govern-
ment priority in its claims, is principally derived from the Act of March 3, 1797, ch.
20, § 5, 1 Stat. 515. The language comes in large part from the Act of March 2, 1799,
ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 676.
3 Section 3467 provides: "Every executor, administrator, or assignee, or other person,
who pays, in whole or in part, any debt due by the person or estate for whom or for
which he acts before he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from such
person or estate, shall become answerable in his own person and estate to the extent of
such payments for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much thereof as may
remain due and unpaid." Congress first imposed personal liability on fiduciaries who
FEDERAL PRIORITY STATUTES
Eighteenth Century to ensure adequate revenues to sustain the
financial burdens of government and to discharge the public debt,4
these sections, liberally construed, 5 combine to render fiduciaries
responsible for administering the estates of deceased or insolvent
debtors personally liable for failing to accord requisite priority to
debts due the United States Government.
In order to avoid personal liability under section 3467, it is
essential that fiduciaries be totally familiar with the applicability
of the federal priority statutes. The purpose of this article is to
assess the burden that personal representatives and assignees must
assume in determining the types of representatives, debts, debtors,
and competing claims to which sections 3466 and 3467 apply. In
addition, particular emphasis will be given to an extremely un-
settled and controversial issue under these sections-the degree of
notice or knowledge of an outstanding government claim to which a
fiduciary is entitled before he can be held personally liable under the
priority statutes.
FiDUCARIES COVERED By THE FEDERAL PRiORIry STATUTES
Perhaps the first question that any fiduciary should ask is whether
he is the type of representative subject to the personal liability
provisions of the priority statutes. Because section 3467 expressly
includes "every executor, administrator [and] . . . assignee," few
problems have arisen in ascertaining those fiduciaries covered by
the statute., Most of the difficulties in determining coverage under
did not make provision for the federal government's priority claims in the Act of
March 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 65, 1 Stat. 676. The history of §§ 3466 and 3467 is discussed
in King v. United States, 379 U.S. 329, 334-45 (1964).
' See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952); United States v. State Bank, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 29 (1832).
"In order to effectuate the purpose of the priority statutes of securing public
revenues, the courts have generally construed sections 3466 and 3467 liberally in
favor of the United States. See, e.g., Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492, 500 (1926);
United States v. Crocker, 313 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1963). However, the statutory purpose
of these sections may also limit the imposition of priority under some circumstances.
United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200, 206 (1939). For an example of this approach see
Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952), where the Court refused to allow priority for
the NLR.B's claim for back pay of a bankrupt's employees because the beneficiaries of
the claim were private parties and, consequently, no public revenue was involved.
Because of their close relationship, the statutes are normally construed together in
determining questions of priority and fiduciary liability. See King v. United States,
379 U.S. 329, 334-36 (1964).
6 The statute has generally been held applicable to trustees, see Delaware v. Irving
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section 3467 have concerned the definition to be afforded the catch-
all category "other persons." In 1953, for example, the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Stephens7 held that a court-appointed receiver
was not embraced within the definition of "other person," since in
the court's view this category was intended to include only personal
representatives of the debtor, and not persons acting at the direction
of a court." Ten years later, however, the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Crocker9 held that the controlling factor in determining who
is an "other person" within the meaning of the statute was not
whether a fiduciary was court-appointed or the debtor's personal
representative, but whether he had been given possession and con-
trol of the debtor's assets and charged with the payment of the
debtor's obligations.10 The resulting split in the circuit courts was
resolved by the Supreme Court in 1964 in King v. United States.1
In King the Court adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and
held that the purpose of section 3467 was clearly "to make those
into whose hands control and possession of the debtor's assets are
placed, responsible for seeing that the Government's priority is
paid."'12 If this is the purpose of the statute, the title of a fiduciary's
position, the mode of his appointment, and the fact that he is not
the personal representative of the debtor are irrelevant considera-
tions. Under the King test, the only significant question to be an-
swered in determining whether a fiduciary qualifies as an "other
person" under section 3467 is whether he has possession and control
of the assets of a deceased or insolvent debtor for the purpose of
satisfying the debtor's outstanding obligations.'8
Trust Co., 92 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 754 (1937), and to assigneces
for the benefit of creditors, see Massachusetts v. United States, 383 U.S. 611 (1948);
Livingston v. Becker, 40 F.2d 673, 674 (E.D. Mo. 1929).
"208 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1953).
8 1d. at 108-09.
313 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1963).
'Old. at 949.
1±879 U.S. 829 (1964).
12 Id. at 887.
" The control and possession test has been used to impose liability upon stock-
holders in complete control of an insolvent corporate debtor's assets, Lakeshore Apart-
ments, Inc. v. United States, 851 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1965), and a defendant who was
president, director, and virtually the sole shareholder in two insolvent corporations.
United States v. Lutz, 295 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1961).
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DEBTS To WHICH FEDERAL PPioaRT ATACHES
After a fiduciary has determined that he is subject to the personal
liability provisions of section 3467, a second problem confronting
him is whether a particular claim asserted by the United States is
entitled to priority under section 3466. While it may be reasonably
accurate to conclude that section 3466 priority applies to virtually
any class of indebtedness due the United States,14 and that neither
the form of the debt nor the mode in which it is incurred are mate-
rial to priority status,15 the fiduciary should be aware of at least
four limitations which are often utilized by the courts to defeat the
attachment of federal priority:
1. The Government must acquire its claim prior to the debtor's
insolvency.
Although the attachment of priority does not depend upon how
the United States acquires its claims against a debtor's estate, it
may be contingent upon when the claim was procured. As a general
rule, the courts have required that the Government obtain its claim
before the manifestation of the debtor's insolvency in order to claim
priority under section 3466.16 A debt transferred to the United
States after the filing of the debtor's bankruptcy petition, for ex-
ample, is not entitled to priority, since the rights of all his creditors
are fixed at the date of filing by the Bankruptcy Act. 7 The courts
have reasoned that to hold otherwise would permit the Government
to purchase general claims after bankruptcy and collect in full
to the detriment of other creditors by invoking the priority statute.18
For similar reasons, a claim acquired by the United States after an
assignment for the benefit of creditors has been held unworthy of
priority status.19
It is important to recognize, however, that the requirement that
a government claim must be acquired before insolvency does not
1' See In re Wilson, 23 F. Supp. 236, 239 (N.D. Tex. 1938); United States v. Barnes,
31 F. 705, 707 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
Il See Bayne v. United States, 93 U.S. 642, 643 (1876).
16 See United States v. Marxen, 807 U.S. 200 (1939); Korman v. Federal Housing
Adm'r, 113 F.2d 743, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1940).1 7 See United States v. Maxxen, 307 U.S. 200 (1939); In re Hansen Bakeries, Inc.,
103 F.2d 665 (3d Cir. 1939); In re Wissmeir, 26 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1989);
In re Stamford Auto Supply Co., 25 F. Supp. 580 (N.D. Tex. 1938); In re Miller, 25 F.
Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
18 See In re Miller, 25 F. Supp. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
19 See Engleman v. Commodity Credit Corp., 107 F. Supp. 930 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
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mean that a claim must mature in advance of insolvency. Reasoning
that the same policy of securing revenues to relieve the financial
burdens of government applies equally to debts presently payable
and those maturing in the future,20 the courts have consistently
defined the word "due" in the statute as synonymous with "owing"
rather than "payable." 21 Thus, a debt owing to the United States
at the date of a debtor's insolvency is entitled to priority under the
statute even if it will not mature until after insolvency has taken
place.
2. The government agency holding the claim must have acquired
it purely as an agent of the federal government and -not as an in-
dependent entity with a separate corporate personality.22
Most federal agencies have little difficulty in qualifying their
claims for priority under section 3466. Past decisions, for example,
have upheld the priority status of claims asserted by such diverse
agencies as the Farm Credit,2 Federal Housing,24 and Small Business
Administrations. 25 On the other hand, the courts are hesitant to
permit agencies with separate and distinct corporate personalities,
like the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, to attain priority status
for claims arising out of their individual endeavors.20 It is possible,
however, even for agencies with separate corporate identities to have
claims entitled to priority status when they act solely as federal agents
with funds from the federal treasury rather than their own coffers.2
3. The Government must be the beneficiary of the proceeds of
the claim.
Where the beneficiaries of a claim asserted by the Government
are private parties, the statutory purpose of securing public revenue
does not require that the claim be accorded priority over competing
2 0 See United States v. State Bank, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 36-37 (1832).
2 11 Id.; Engleman v. Commodity Credit Corp., 107 F. Supp. 930, 932 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
See also Bernhard, Government Priority for Repayment of Monies Advanced to Con-
tractors, 33 GEo. L.J. 279, 281-87 (1945).
22 See Korman v. Federal Housing Adm'r, 113 F.2d 743, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
23 See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Remund, 330 U.S. 539 (1947); In re
Wilson, 23 F. Supp. 236 (N.D. Tex. 1938).
2"See Korman v. Federal Housing Adm'r, 113 F.2d 743, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Wagner
v. McDonald, 96 F.2d 273, 276 (8th Cir. 1938).
21See Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960); W.T. Jones
& Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881, 885 (4th Cir. 1963).
28 See In re Peoria Consol. Mfrs., Inc., 286 F.2d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 1961) (dictum);
West Va. Rail Co. v. Jewett Bigelow & Brooks Coal Co., 26 F.2d 503, 504-05 (E.D. Ky.
1928) (dictum).2T See In re Peoria Consol. Mfrs., Inc., 286 F.2d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 1961).
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obligations. For this reason, the courts have generally refused to
permit the United States to utilize its statutory priority for the bene-
fit of private persons.28 A National Labor Relations Board order
for back pay for the employees of an insolvent debtor, for example,
is not considered worthy of section 8466 priority.29 Similarly, a
claim for money distributed by the Indian Agency to a guardian of
minor Indian children who deposited the money in a bank which
later became insolvent was held not entitled to priority status, since
the United States was not a party to the purely private guardian-bank
transaction."0 However, where funds are deposited in a bank by
an agent or officer of the United States, and it is clear that the
Government is the actual beneficiary of the claim, priority attaches.31
Thus, it is probably safe to generalize that, in order for a claim
asserted by the United States to be entitled to priority under section
3466, its collection must benefit the public revenue, and not private
individuals.
4. According priority to the claim must not conflict with another
congressional policy.
In those cases in which the Supreme Court has refused to uphold
the priority status of a government claim, it has usually been because
the application of section 3466 priority would, in a particular case,
conflict with other congressional policies.2  In United States v.
Guaranty Trust Company,33 for example, the Court declined to apply
the priority statutes on the ground that to do so, under the circum-
stances, would tend to thwart the purpose of the Transportation Act
of 1920. For similar reasons, the Court, in Cook County National
Bank v. United States,34 denied priority to a federal deposit claim
against an insolvent national bank, since priority was, in its view,
inconsistent with the congressional act which created the national
banking system.
28 See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952); United States v. Johnson, 87 F.2d
155 (10th Cir. 1936).
20 See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
80 United States v. Johnson, 87 F.2d 155, 161 (10th Cir. 1936); see Spicer v. Smith,
288 U.S. 430 (1933).
31 See Barnett v. American Surety Co., 77 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1935). But cf. Cook
County Nat'l Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445 (1882) (deposit of federal funds in
national bank held not entitled to priority).
02 See notes 33-34 infra and accompanying text.
"280 U.S. 478 (1930).
"107 U.S. 445 (1882).
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What constitutes sufficient inconsistency to preclude the applica-
tion of the priority statutes has never been clearly defined by the
Supreme Court. The only guidance offered by the Court which
even approaches a meaningful test is its holding in United States V.
Emory35 that "only the plainest inconsistency would warrant our
finding an implied exception to the operation of so clear a command
as that of § 3466." 36 Since Emory, the Court has affirmed its "plainest
inconsistency" criterion in United States Department of Agriculture
v. Remund,37 holding that congressional legislation authorizing
emergency crop and feed loans is not inconsistent with federal
priority. With varying results the lower federal courts have at-
tempted to follow the Emory approach in assessing the consistency
of section 3466 with other federal legislation.88 An examination of
these cases, however, reveals that so long as the "plainest incon-
sistency" test prevails, the priority status of government claims will
face little danger from other congressional legislation.89
TYPES OF DEBTORS TO WHICH THE FEDERAL PRIORITY
STATUTES APPLY
A fiduciary must also ask whether the debtor whose assets or
estate he is responsible for administering is within the coverage of
the priority statutes. It is clear that section 3466 includes two basic
types of debtors within its provisions: (1) a debtor who dies leaving
an estate insufficient to discharge all his outstanding obligations; and
(2) a debtor who becomes insolvent while still alive.40 The first type
of debtor covered by the statute is self-explanatory, and few ob-
stacles, if any, exist in discovering those who qualify under this
"314 U.S. 423 (1941).
"Id. at 433.
380 U.S. 539 (1947).
S See, e.g., Korman v. Federal Housing Adm'r, 113 F.2d 743, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1940)
(giving F.H.A. loan claims priority actually furthers the objectives of the National
Housing Act); In re J.F. Mulkey Co., 189 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Mich. 1960) (priority
is not incompatible with the goals of the Defense Production Act of 1950).
80 See cases cited notes 35-88 supra. In Massachusetts v. United States, 338 U.S. 611
(1948), the Court held that a federal claim for unemployment compensation taxes under
Title 9 of the Social Security Act should not be diminished by a state claim for ninety
percent of that amount, which is allowed as a credit under the Act. Justice Jackson,
in a vigorous dissent joined by three others, said that § 8466 "should not lightly be
construed to frustrate a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute." Id. at 635.
" 01 U.S.C. § 191 (1964); see Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 886, 488.
39 (1828); United States v. Belkin, 858 F.2d 378, 381-82 (6th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Crocker, 818 F.2d 946, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1963).
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provision. However, living debtors who are included under section
3466 are not so easily ascertained. The statute provides that in order
for priority to attach to government claims against a living debtor
he must be insolvent, and his insolvency must be manifested in one
of three ways: (1) by voluntary assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors; (2) by attachment of his estate as an absconding, concealed, or
absent debtor; or (3) by the commission of an act of bankruptcy.41
Under any of these tests the courts have held that the controlling
consideration is whether the debtor has actually transferred title and
possession of all his assets to a fiduciary.42 As long as a debtor retains
title to or possession of his property, section 3466 will not apply,43
regardless of the insufficiency of his assets to meet his obligations.44
Moreover, a debtor must surrender all of his property to a fiduciary,
since a partial divestment is not enough to invoke the priority
statutes. 45 While it is possible under section 3466 for a debtor's
insolvency to be manifested by the attachment of his estate as an
absconding, concealed, or absent debtor,46 the two most frequently
recognized indications are the voluntary assignment and the act
of bankruptcy:
1. Voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors.
An assignment for the benefit of creditors has been defined as a
"transfer without compulsion of law by a debtor of his property to
an assignee in trust to apply the same or the proceeds thereof to the
payment of his debts ... ."47 In applying this definition, the courts
have generally demanded three requirements: (1) the purpose of
the assignment must be to pay creditors of the assignor;48 (2) the
"1 See United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 426 (1941); authorities cited note 40
sup ra.
12 See Bramwell v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 488 (1926);
Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 102, 133-34 (1838).
"1 See authorities cited note 42 supra.
"Federal priority will not attach merely because a debtor is insolvent. See United
States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 260 (1923); United States v. Hooe, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
73, 90-91 (1805); W.T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir.
1963); Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YAL L..
228, 237 (1967).
" See Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 438-39 (1828); United States
v. Fabricated Air Prods. Co., 206 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Tex. 1962).
," See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
47 United States v. Fabricated Air Prods. Co., 206 F. Supp. 228, 231 (E.D. Tex. 1962).
is Id.
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assignment must be made to a fiduciary; 49 and (3) the assignment
must transfer all the assets of the debtor to the fiduciary. 0 While
some courts have also indicated that the debtor must take some
affirmative action in initiating the assignmentr' the majority require
only that he acquiesce in the transfer of his assets.5 2 A fiduciary,
therefore, may assume that any consensual transfer of a debtor's assets
to him for the purpose of satisfying creditors will be a sufficient mani-
festation of insolvency to invoke the priority statutes regardless of
who initiated the assignment.
2. Act of bankruptcy.
Because the Bankruptcy Act classifies a general assignment for
the benefit of creditors as an act of bankruptcy, many courts have
characterized a voluntary assignment as an act of bankruptcy. 8
Aside from the general assignment, however, the most frequently
occurring act of bankruptcy affecting the priority statutes is the pro-
curement or appointment of a receiver to administer a debtor's
estate.5 4 While a contrary rule existed prior to the 1926 amendments
to the Bankruptcy Act,55 subsequent Supreme Court decisions have
40 See United States v. Sullivan, 19 F. Supp. 695, 699 (W.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 95
F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1938) (per curiam).
"
0 See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
"I See Mothersead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 22 F.2d 644, 652-53 (8th
Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 637 (1928).
r2 The following actions have been held to be voluntary assignments by the courts:
a debtor's consent to a court order giving a receiver exclusive control of the debtor's
assets for the benefit of creditors, United States v. Butterworth-Judson Corp., 269 U.S.
504, 513-14 (1926); Hatch v. Morosco Holding Co., 56 F.2d 640 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 61
F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 613 (1933); a debtor's filing of an answer
in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding consenting to adjudication as a bankrupt,
In re Waxaid Co., 55 F. Supp. 289, 290 (D. Md. 1943); and a debtor's acquiescence in
the taking of his property by an authorized state official in order to administer it
for the benefit of creditors, United States ex rel. Ray v. Porter, 19 F.2d 541, 544 (D.
Idaho 1927).53E.g., In re Waxaid Co., 55 F. Supp. 289 (D. Md. 1943); In re Berthoud, 231 F.
529 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 238 F. 797 (2d Cir. 1916); see Bankruptcy Act § 3 (a) (5),
11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (5) (1964). Sections 3(a) (1) through 8 (a) (6) of the Act, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 21 (a) (1)- (6) (1964), classify six activities as acts of bankruptcy.
51See Bankruptcy Act § 3 (a) (6), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (6) (1964).
1 Prior to 1926, the Supreme Court held that the appointment of a receiver was
not necessarily an act of bankruptcy, because the Bankruptcy Act then required that
the reason for the appointment must have been the insolvency of the debtor if the
appointment was to qualify as an act of bankruptcy. See United States v. Oklahoma,
261 U.S. 253 (1923). Since receivers are often appointed for reasons other than
insolvency (e.g., to act as a state agent to protect the depositors of an insolvent bank),
appointment was not an automatic act of bankruptcy under such a rule. However,
the 1926 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act solved this problem by removing the
necessity for showing an exclusive causal relationship between insolvency and appoint-
[Vol. 1968: 44
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uniformly held that the appointment of a general equity receiver is
an act of bankruptcy sufficient to accord priority status to claims owed
to the United States by the debtor.56
The requirements for an act of bankruptcy for the purposes of
determining section 3466 priority closely parallel those for a volun-
tary assignment. Thus, priority may attach even though the debtor
did not initiate the appointment of the receiver.5 Similarly, the
statutes will not apply unless the receiver is given title and possession
of all the debtor's assets.58 The appointment of a receiver in a
Bankrutpcy Act Chapter XI proceeding, for example, is not an act
of bankruptcy for section 3466 purposes, since under this arrange-
ment the debtor remains in possession of his property and continues
to operate his business with court supervision.59 A receiver, how-
ever, who has complete control of a debtor's assets may be reason-
ably certain that government claims are entitled to priority under
section 3466.
CLASSES OF COMPETING CREDITORS TO WHICH FEDERAL
PRIORITY APPLIES
As a general rule, a fiduciary faced with competing claims asserted
by federal and non-federal or private claimants can be fairly con-
fident that, as between the two, the federal claim will be entitled to
priority under section 3466.10 There are several exceptions to this
generalization, however, and in examining them it is necessary for
analytical purposes to separate non-bankruptcy and bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.
1. Non-bankruptcy proceedings.
While creditors holding prior state statutory or common law
liens have often competed with the United States for preference in
the distribution of the assets of a deceased or insolvent debtor, the
ment. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, § 3, 404 Stat. 662; see United States v. Bliss, 40
F.2d 935, 936 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 44 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1930).
"' See Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 367-70 (1946); United States
v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 426 (1941); United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 483 (1941).
1; See Adams v. United States, 24 F.2d 907, 908 (9th Cir. 1928), aff'g 9 F.2d 624
(W.D. Wash. 1925); Mothersead v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 22 F.2d 644,
652-53 (8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 637 (1928).58 See United States v. National Furniture Co., 348 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1965).
"O d.
60 See Meaders, Priority of Federal Tax Claims in Nonbankruptcy Proceedings, 50
A.B.A.J. 288, 289 (1964).
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Supreme Court has consistently found federal claims entitled to
priority under section 8466.61 In doing so the Court's methodology
has been to subordinate earlier competing liens by characterizing
them as "general and inchoate" rather than "specific and per-
fected.162  The Court first held that a general and inchoate lien
must yield to subsequently acquired federal claims in 1929 in County
of Spokane v. United States."3 For a decade thereafter, the Court
continued to hold competing liens inferior to United States claims,
making little effort to clarify its standards for determining under
what circumstances a lien was to be considered specific and per-
fected.64 However, in United States v. Waddill, Holland, & Flinn,
Incorporated,65 and Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell,00 decided
in 1945 and 1946 respectively, the Court attempted to clarify its
previous decisions. It began by holding that the effect of a com-
peting lien upon United States priority is always a federal question
to be decided by the federal courts, regardless of the characterization
of the lien under state law. 67  Next, and most importantly, the
Court enunciated three requirements which must be met before a
lien may be considered specific and perfected. It must be explicit
as to: (1) the identity of the lienor; (2) the amount of the lien; and
(3) the particular property to which the lien is attached.0 8 Sub-
01 See notes 63-70 infra and accompanying text.
6 2For an attack on the origin and retention of the inchoate and general lien doctrine
see Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career
of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YAIr L.J. 905 (1954). Kennedy argues that in
enacting the priority statutes Congress had no intention of overriding valid liens arising
prior to federal claims. Id. at 907. See also Plumb, supra note 44, at 229-33.
'8279 U.S. 80 (1929). The case involved state taxes which were assessed prior to
the federal tax assessment, but because state statutory procedure for acquiring a tax
lien had not been followed, the Court held that the state lien was not "specific." Id.
at 94.
0, See United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480, 486-88 (1941) (unsecured federal
tax claim held superior to unsecured state tax lien on grounds that property to which
the lien was to attach and the amount of the lien were uncertain); United States v.
Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936); New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933).
05323 U.S. 353 (1945).
00329 U.S. 862 (1946).
7 323 U.S. at 356-57; 329 U.S. at 371. If state law describes the lien in question as
inchoate, however, the Court will take this determination as "practically conclusive."
Id. at 371.
68 329 U.S. at 375. In applying its criteria for a specific and perfected lien, the
Court, in United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 357-60 (1945),
found that neither a landlord's lien nor a municipal tax lien were specific, since the
amount of the liens and the property they covered were not definite. In Illinois ex
rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946), the uncertainty of the property to
which the lien attached caused its subordination to a federal claim, even though record
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sequent decisions have left these requirements relatively undefined,
with one exception. In 1953, in United States v. Gilbert Associates,
Incorporated,609 the Court added content to its third requirement by
holding that a lien is sufficiently definite as to particular property
only when the lienholder has acquired title or possession of the
property subject to his lien. Interestingly enough, the Court has not
had the occasion actually to decide that a specific and perfected lien
will be entitled to priority over a later federal claim, since in apply-
ing the foregoing criteria it has successfully managed in every case
since County of Spokane to characterize competing liens as general
and inchoate rather than specific and perfected.70
Although the lower federal courts have generally attempted to
apply the tests suggested by the Supreme Court in assessing the
character of competing liens,71 at least one circuit has taken the
additional step, avoided thus far by the Supreme Court, of actually
holding that a specific and perfected lien will prevail over a later
notice of the competing lien had specified the identity of the lienor and the amount of
the lien.
00 345 U.S. 361, 366 (1953). It seems somewhat peculiar that the Supreme Court
should suggest that acquiring title may be a prerequisite to perfecting a lien. Such
an acquisition, prior to the existence of a federal claim, would mean that the "lienor"
was the property owner anyway. The divested debtor's subsequent federal obligation
would be irrelevant.
The thrust of this decision is that "'specificity' requires that the lien be attached
to certain property by reducing it to possession, on the theory that the United States
has no claim against property no longer in the possession of the debtor." Id. (em-
phasis added). There is apparently some confusion in this area as to whether the
possession requirement applies to liens on real estate. See Plumb, supra note 44, at
234-35.
7o See Meaders, supra note 60, at 289. But Kennedy asserts that the Court settled
the issue as early as 1828 by holding a mere equitable lien superior to United States
priority in Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828). See Kennedy,
supra note 62, at 909. The Court did find a specific lien based on its three criteria in
United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954). However, the Government's claim
in New Britain was not based on the federal priority statutes. Perhaps the most ex-
plicit dictum that a specific lien will prevail over federal priority is Justice Brandeis'
statement in United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544, 551 (1936), that a general and in-
choate lien "lacks the characteristics of a specific perfected lien which alone bars the
priority of the United States."
71 The Fourth Circuit has held a mechanic's lien arising under state law inferior
to a competing federal claim on the ground that, although the lien had been filed
and recorded, the lienholder had not secured a final judgment and enforced his
claim against specific property of the debtor. W.T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty,
Inc., 318 F.2d 881, 887 (4th Cir. 1963). Similarly, the Sixth Circuit recently granted
preference to a federal claim over a municipal tax lien because the municipality had
taken no action to attach its lien to specific property. United States v. County of
Wayne, 378 F.2d 671, 672 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam), eert. denied, 389 U.S. 972 (1967).
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federal claim;72 and there are dicta in the opinions of several other
lower federal courts supporting this view.73 The reluctance of most
federal courts to find that a lien is specific and perfected under the
Court's criteria, however, greatly reduces the significance of these
opinions. Indeed, the current trend seems to be toward holding
almost all prior competing liens inferior to United States claims
by simply labeling them general and inchoate, and thus side-stepping
the more troublesome issue of the status to be accorded a specific
and perfected lien. One commentator became so exasperated with
this approach that he concluded that the category of general and in-
choate liens as defined by the courts must "embrace practically every
lien to be found in modem American law."74 While such a state-
ment may be somewhat over-inclusive, it would seem that little short
of a judgment and execution on specific property of a debtor, thus
divesting him of title and possession, is likely to satisfy the courts in
their quest for specificity and perfection.70
Apparently the only lien to escape the judicial conundrum of
the "general and inchoate" vs. "specific and perfected" distinction is
the ordinary mortgage lien. The original rationale for according a
mortgage lien priority over a subsequently acquired federal claim
was based on the common law theory that a mortgagee received title
to the mortgaged property.76 Thus, the debtor who mortgaged his
property before he became indebted to the United States had no title
or interest in the property to which federal priority could attach.77
Although most states have abandoned the title theory and now view
a mortgage as merely giving the mortgagee a lien on the mortgagor's
property,71 the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to reverse
its earlier holdings that a prior mortgage is entitled to priority over
competing federal claims.79 However, in view of the prevailing rule
72 See United States v. Atlantic Municipal Corp., 212 F.2d 709, 711 (5th Cir. 1954).
73see United States v. Saidman, 231 F.2d 503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United States
v. Department of Indus. Relations, 201 F.2d 857, 859 (9th Cir. 1953); United States v.
Haddix & Sons, 252 F. Supp. 634, 636 (E.D. Mich. 1966).
7' Kennedy, supra note 62, at 918.
75 See note 71 supra and cases cited therein.
76 See, e.g., Thelusson v. Smith, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 396, 426 (1817); United States
v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 1929), af'd on other grounds, 280
U.S. 478 (1930); Meaders, supra note 60, at 290.
77 See authorities cited note 76 supra.
78 See Meaders, supra note 60, at 290.
79 See Kennedy, supra note 62, at 918-19. Lower federal courts have continued
to find that mortgages negate United States priority. See United States v. Boston &
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that a mortgagee has only a lien, and the Court's current criteria for
determining whether a lien is specific and perfected, it is possible
that, if confronted with the issue today, the Court might be in-
clined to find at least some mortgage liens subordinate to subse-
quently acquired federal claims.8 0 It would seem, therefore, that a
fiduciary may reasonably anticipate that in a non-bankrutpcy pro-
ceeding a federal claim will almost invariably be entitled to priority
over an earlier lien, unless the competing lien has been enforced by
judgment and execution on particular property of the deceased or
insolvent debtor.81
2. Bankruptcy proceedings.
Because the Bankruptcy Act establishes its own system of priori-
ties, 2 section 3466 does not grant an absolute preference to federal
claims in bankruptcy proceedings. Under the Bankruptcy Act four
categories of competing claims are entitled to priority over debts due
the United States: (1) costs and expenses of administering the assets
of the insolvent debtor; (2) wages owed the employees of the in-
solvent debtor which were earned within three months of the com-
mencement of the bankruptcy proceedings; (3) reasonable costs and
expenses of creditors in securing the refusal or revocation of a con-
firmation of a discharge in bankruptcy, wage-earner plan, or other
arrangement; and (4) taxes owed to any state or subdivision there-
of.83 While a thorough discussion of priorities in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings is beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that these four
categories do not embrace the entire spectrum of competing obliga-
tions. Within the fifth priority afforded claims of the United States,
section 3466 is applicable in the same manner as in a non-bankruptcy
proceeding.8 4
Berlin Transp. Co., 237 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (D.N.H. 1964); United States v. Anthony,
231 F. Supp. 414, 421 (S.D. Iowa 1964); Bank of Wrangell v. Alaska Asiatic Lumber
Mills, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D. Alas. 1949).
80 See Meaders, supra note 60, at 290. In Bank of Wrangell v. Alaska Asiatic Lum-
ber Mills, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alas. 1949), the court analyzed a mortgage lien in
terms of the three federal tests of specificity and found it insufficient to be declared
specific. However, the court deferred to the weight of precedent in allowing the mort-
gage lien to destroy federal priority. Id. at 5.
81 One exception to this observation is that expenses of administering the insolvent's
assets take priority over federal claims. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 274 F.2d
8, 12-13 (8th Cir. 1960).
11 See Bankruptcy Act § 64(a), 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (1964).
83 Id.
81 See Small Business Administration v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 447 n.5 (1960);
United States v. Belkin, 358 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 1966).
Vol. 1968: 44]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
NOTICE REQUIRED TO IMPOSE PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER
T=E FEDERAL PRIOITY STATUTES
The foregoing sections of this article have all assumed that the
fiduciary was fully apprised of an outstanding government claim
against the estate of the decedent or insolvent prior to the distribu-
tion of assets. However, since the courts have held that a person may
be subject to personal liability under section 3467 even though the
United States has made no effort to assert its claim in probate or
bankruptcy proceedings as other creditors are required to do,85 every
fiduciary needs to be thoroughly familiar with the requirements for
adequate "notice" under the priority statute.
As early as 1804, in United States v. Fisher,8s Chief Justice
Marshal recognized that the impositon of personal liability under
section 3467 should be limited to those cases in which the fiduciary
has notice or knowledge of the existence of a United States claim.87
While subsequent decisions have engrafted upon the statute a gen-
eral requirement that a fiduciary have some knowledge of the Gov-
ernment's claim,88 they have at best succeeded only in establishing
the outer limits of what constitutes adequate notice. At the threshold
the rules are clear. It is firmly established, for example, that a
fiduciary will be personally liable if he fails to accord priority to
United States claims after the Government has notified him, either
85 See, e.g., Viles v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956) (state probate pro-
ceeding); United States v. Barnes, 31 F. 705 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887) (bankruptcy proceed-
ing). In United States v. Murphy, 15 F. 589 (C.C.D. Ind. 1883), however, the court
refused to impose personal liability upon a trustee in bankruptcy who distributed
the assets in his possession knowing of an outstanding judgment of the United States
against the debtor because the Government had knowledge of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing and did not submit its claim therein.
If the United States does submit its claim in a probate proceeding, it is bound by
the decision of the supervising court. See United States v. Muntzing, 69 F. Supp. 503
(N.D.W. Va. 1946); United States v. Pate, 47 F. Supp. 965 (W.D. Ark. 1942). If the
Government submits a claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, its priority is governed by
§64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §104(a) (1964), and not by the priorities
statutes exclusively. See United States v. Gargill, 218 F.2d 556 (Ist Cir. 1955); In re
Silver, 109 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. ill.), aff'd, 204 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1953); cf. District of
Columbia v. Greenbaum, 223 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See notes 82-84 supra and
accompanying text.
8 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1805).
87 Chief Justice Marshall stated: "I only say for myself, as the point has not been
submitted to the court, that it [the priority statute] does not appear to me to create
a devastavit in the administration of effects, and would require notice, in order to
bind the executor, or administrator or assignee." Id. at 390 n.a.
88 See, e.g., United States v. Ricketts, 27 F. Cas. 806 (No. 16,159) (C.C.D.C. 1825).
See generally Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 446, 450-52 (1955).
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formally or informally, through its agent or representative, that it
believes it has a claim against the assets he is responsible for admin-
istering, though the claim may not be perfected or even established
as to amount.89 Conversely, it is equally well settled that a fiduciary
will not be personally liable under the statute unless he had some
"knowledge" or "notice" of the United States claim before he under-
took to distribute the assets of the decedent or insolvent.90 Unfor-
tunately, these general rules do not answer any of the questions of
adequate notice that fall between the extremes they represent. Nor
are the answers easily found by merely reciting the statements in
many of the older cases that a fiduciary subject to the provisions of
section 3467 is a trustee for the United States with the duties of a
fiduciary acting for the United States.91 It is additionally unfortunate,
moreover, that the recent case law has done little to fill this void.
Two recent cases, for example, draw entirely different conclusions as
to what constitutes adequate notice under the priority statutes. In
1966, in United States v. Vibradamp Corporation,92 the Government
had contended that an "executor acts at his peril if he distributes the
estate without first making certain that no branch of the Federal
Government is holding a claim against the estate . . ... 3 The
district court, however, rejected this contention and held that the
notice required under section 3467 "is actual knowledge of such
facts as would put a prudent person on inquiry as to the existence
of the claim of the United States." 94 Although this holding alone
was sufficient to dismiss the action, the court continued in sig-
nificant dictum to express its opinion of the obligation of a fiduciary
under the priority statutes by asking:
811 See Viles v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956); United States v. Kaplan,
74 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1935); United States v. Munroe, 65 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Pa.
1946); United States v. Weisburn, 48 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
0oSee Livington v. Becker, 40 F.2d 673 (E.D. Mo. 1929); Giovaninni Terranova,
12 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1186 (1943); Irving Trust Co., 36 B.T.A. 146 (1937); Rev. Rul.
66-43, 1966-1 Cums. BuLL. 291. In United States v. Eyges, 286 F. 683, 684 (D. Mass.
1923), for example, the court said: "Where the tax is not brought to the trustee's or
the court's attention, and he does not know of it, and no order is made for the
payment of it, and he distributes the assets in accordance with the orders of the bank-
ruptcy court, it would be plainly unjust and would be going beyond what the
statute contemplated to hold that he is personally liable."
D1In United States v. Barnes, 31 F. 705, 707 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887), for example, the
court stated: "The assignee becomes a trustee for the United States, and is bound to
pay their debt first out of the proceeds of the debtor's property."
0. 257 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
geId. at 935.
061d. (emphasis in original).
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Even if [the executor] ... did recognize the existence of [a potential
government claim] . . .. was he obliged to arouse this 'long
sleeping dog' and suggest to the Government that it might assert
a claim? Such conduct would hardly be in harmony with the in-
terests of the beneficiaries under the will, to whom the executor has
a fiduciary duty. But does the executor nonetheless fail at his
peril to remind the Government of all the potential claims that it
might have against the estate and suggest that they be prosecuted? 6
The court thought not. In its view of the statutory language "debts
due the United States" could only have been intended to mean "those
debts concerning which the Government has asserted a claim before
the distribution is made." 6 For fiduciaries, such a rule was just too
good to be true. One year later it was firmly rejected by the Tax
Court in Leroy K. New, 97 the court holding that adequate notice
under section 3467 required only that a fiduciary be "chargeable
with knowledge of the debt to the United States."0 8 Under the test
adopted by the Tax Court, a fiduciary has sufficient notice of a
United States claim when he is "in possession of such facts as that
a faithful and fair discharge of his duty would put him on in-
quiry." 99  Moreover, once "on inquiry," his investigation must not
only be thorough, it must include an inquiry to the federal govern-
ment itself, since according to the court, a fiduciary "pursues a uni-
lateral inquiry at his peril."'100 Any other conclusion, in the court's
view, would make the fiduciary the sole arbiter of what the estate
owed the Government, thus entirely nullifying the effect of section
3467.101
As Vibradamp and New reveal, as of 1967 the requirements of
adequate notice under section 3467 are yet to be agreed upon by
the courts. A fiduciary, however, should be aware of at least three
11 Id. at 936.
96 Id. In support of its view the court cited Field v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)
182 (1835); United States v. Crocker, 313 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1963); and Want V. Com-
missioner, 280 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1960). Of these cases, only the language of Want
directly supports the proposition that the federal government must have actually
asserted a claim prior to distribution. See 280 F.2d at 783.
-1 P-H TAx CT. REP. 48.65 (Aug. 9, 1967).
Is Id. at 482.
9"Id. Paradoxically, the notice to the fiduciary consisted of opinions that the
decedent owed income taxes from persons who did not appear to have knowledge of
any facts which could cause the imposition of a tax. In fact, the tax was due because
of income which was unknown to the persons who put the fiduciary "on inquiry."




vital notice issues which may be determinative of his liability under
the priority statutes:
1. Must the fiduciary be informed of the Government's claim by
an officer or agent of the United States?
The cases which have considered this question have for the most
part answered it in the negative. In 1826, for example, it was
decided in United States v. Clark102 that notice of a government
claim adequate for the imposition of personal liability under section
3467 does not have to emanate from an officer or agent of the United
States. Over a century later, this view was reaffirmed by the Board
of Tax Appeals in Irving Trust Company03 when it stated:
If the [fiduciary] ... has knowledge of the debt, it matters not how
that knowledge was obtained. The [fiduciary] . .. cannot dis-
regard or ignore the debt, and if he does, his breach of duty renders
him liable personally. 04
While the court in Vibradamp did not reach the source of notice
issue,0 5 the holding of the Tax Court in New clearly supports the
rule that a fiduciary need not acquire his notice of the government
claim from a federal agent to be personally liable under section
3467.
The only reason, in good policy, for adopting a different rule,
and imposing a requirement that adequate notice must be given
by an officer or agent of the United States, is that without such a
requirement the fiduciary must carry the often heavy burden of
proving that he was without sufficient knowledge of the government
claim to accord it the requisite priority under the statute 0 6 Poten-
10 825 F. Cas. 447 (No. 14,807) (C.C.N.Y. 1826).
'0- 36 B.T.A. 146 (1937).
204 Id. at 148 (dictum). The Board of Tax Appeals held, however, that the fiduciary
was not personally liable under § 3467 because it was unable to "discover anything
in the record . . .which might have put a reasonably prudent trustee upon inquiry
as to whether or not there was any debt due the United States." Id.
105 However, the court's statement that there was no indication of how the fiduciary
knew "or should have known" of the existence of the potential government claim,
257 F. Supp. at 936, appears to have left the door open to such proof had it been
offered.
200The fiduciary undoubtedly has this burden of proof in assertions of tax liability
pursuant to § 6901 (a) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
§ 6901 (a) (I) (B). It is not altogether clear whether he has this burden in other cases.
The Government could well argue that it has proved a prima facie case of liability
without any evidence of notice, which it would claim was a matter of defense. Cf.
L.T. McCourt, 15 T.C. 734 (1950). In fact, the Government normally includes an
allegation that the defendant had notice of the United States claim in its complaint.
See, e.g., King v. United States, 379 U.S. 329 (1964).
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tial injustice may exist in placing the burden of proof of lack of
knowledge of United States claims upon the person against whom
personal liability under section 3467 is sought to be imposed. It is
submitted, therefore, that the Government be required by rule or
statute to prove that the fiduciary had knowledge of a United States
claim at the time he satisfied other claimants before liability under
section 3467 may be imposed.
2. Must the Government actually assert its claim against the
estate of the deceased or insolvent debtor prior to the distribution
of assets by the fiduciary?
Although the Vibradamp court stated unequivocally that the
United States should be required to assert its claim prior to the distri-
bution of assets as a condition precedent to the imposition of per-
sonal liability under section 3467,107 few cases lend direct support
to this view. On the other hand, both New and Clark clearly hold
that adequate notice under the statute does not require that the
Government actually assert its claim. 08 The latter rule will prob-
ably prevail, since under the Vibradamp approach the fiduciary is in
a position, if he has indirect knowledge or notice of a potential claim
not yet asserted by the Government, to thwart the effectiveness of
the priority statutes by hastily distributing the assets of a deceased or
insolvent debtor before federal preference can attach. It would
seem, however, that this objection to requiring the Government
actually to assert its claim before distribution of assets could be allevi-
ated, if not overcome, by holding that fiduciaries may be personally
liable for any distribution of assets made to hinder the collection
of a United States claim.
3. What actions should a fiduciary take to avoid personal liability
if he knows of an actual or potential United States claim?
It is clear that the actual assertion of a claim by the United
States is sufficient notice to impose upon a fiduciary the duty of
according priority to debts owing the United States. 00 Once the
Government has asserted its claim and the fiduciary has knowledge
of it, his duty under the priority statute demands that he make every
effort to satisfy the federal claim before distributing assets to other
claimants, which might deplete the estate of the decedent or in-
107 257 F. Supp. at 936. See notes 92-96 supra and accompanying text.
108 See notes 98, 102 supra and accompanying text.
209 See note 89 supra and accompanying text.
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solvent below the amount due the United States." 0 While it is
arguable that such a duty may require, under some circumstances,
that a fiduciary seek the aid of administrative or judicial determina-
tions,"' a fiduciary should not be made to retain, at his peril, assets
in excess of the claim actually asserted by the United States, even
though the Government may be permitted to increase the amount
of its claim and demand that this increase be entitled to priority in
a suit directed against either the estate or the transferees of the
proceeds thereof."2
The more difficult issue, however, concerns the duty of a fiduciary
after he has received information which indicates that the Govern-
ment might have a potential, but unasserted, claim against the assets
of the estate which he is responsible for administering. An executor,
for example, may be aware that the decedent had taken substantial
deductions or exclusions on his income tax returns, which may be
contested by the Government if the returns are audited. If, after
a thorough investigation of the basis of the decedent's tax reporting,
the executor concludes that the treatment of these items was proper,
albeit disputable, can he safely distribute the assets of the estate?
This is basically the question posed by the court in Vibradamp
when it asked whether a fiduciary should be required, at his peril,
to "arouse this 'long sleeping dog' and suggest to the Government
that it might assert a claim.""n 3 Although the district court in
Vibradamp concluded, in dictum, that such conduct would not be in
harmony with the interests of the beneficiaries under the will, and,
thus, not a proper action of executors,"14 both Clark and New
espouse a contrary conclusion. In Clark the district court held un-
210 See United States v. Hurst, 2 F.2d 73 (D. Wyo. 1924). In that case the court
stated that a fiduciary could not rely on government inactivity after the issue of a
potential claim was raised, "but should have reasonably pursued his activities to
securing [sic] an adjustment of the matter before making distribution of the estate."
Id. at 80; cf. United States v. Kaplan, 74 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1935).
"'
1 See notes 113-17 infra and accompanying text.
12 In United States v. Barnes, 81 F. 705, 709 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887), the court stated:
"The assignee can ascertain, if he uses reasonable diligence, what part of the estate
should be reserved to meet the claim of the government, and the rest of the estate can
be distributed to the other creditors ...."
"1 257 F. Supp. at 936. In Irving Trust Co., 36 B.T.A. 146, 149 (1937), the court
reached a similar conclusion: "The Commissioner says that the petitioner should
have inquired of the collector whether or not any taxes were due. But the petitioner





equivocally that after a fiduciary has been put on notice of a
potential government claim, he is under a duty to accord that
claim priority under section 3467.11" According to the court, a
fiduciary must, if necessary, go so far as to "make inquiry at the
proper [government] office" to ascertain if the potential claim actu-
ally exists.116 Similarly, in New the Tax Court held that a fiduciary,
who is chargeable with knowledge of a possible federal tax liability,
must inquire of the Internal Revenue Service whether they wish
to assert a claim, or pursue "a unilateral inquiry at his peril."' 17
Important considerations may have been overlooked, however,
in the Clark and New decisions. Both courts seemingly ignored
the strong policy favoring the expeditious disposition of the estates
of deceased and insolvent debtors. Such a policy is obviously
thwarted by requiring every fiduciary to work his way through the
maze of administrative procedures necessary to obtain a binding
decision from any federal agency that it has no claim against the
estate. 1 8 In addition, the reasoning of the Tax Court in New that
a different rule "would make the fiduciary the final arbiter of what
the estate owed in tax, a result entirely nullifying all effect of [the
priority statute] . . . ,I'll does not distinguish adequately between
the priority afforded federal claims by section 3466 and the duty
imposed upon a fiduciary under section 3467. Section 3466 provides
that United States claims have priority over all competing obliga-
tions, 120 and, under this section, the Government is entitled, despite
a wrongful distribution of assets by the fiduciary, to trace the assets
of the decedent or insolvent into the hands of all gratuitous trans-
"' 25 F. Cas. at 451.
21 6 Id.
111 P-H TAX CT. REP. 48.65, at 483 (Aug. 9, 1967).
118 Even the Internal Revenue Service recognizes that after a personal representative
has requested prompt assessment of taxes due from a decedent under § 6501 (d) of the
Code, and has had no response after eighteen months, he may distribute the assets in
his hands without risk of liability under § 3467, albeit the Government may
assert taxes due against the transferees if the decedent had submitted false or fraudu-
lent returns. See Rev. Rul. 66-43, 1966-1 Cum. BuLL. 291. Most states, however, im-
pose a limit of six months for the filing of estate claims. Even if prompt assessment is
requested, the estate may have to be open eighteen months waiting for IRS action.
This is an unreasonably long period for many smaller estates to be open. For a good
example of how §§ 3466 and 3467 may be utilized to frustrate the orderly admin-
istration of a receivership see Pennsylvania Cement Co. v. Bradley Contracting Co., 274
F. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
119 P-H TAX CT. REP. 48.65, at 483 (Aug. 9, 1967).
22 See 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964).
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ferees for the satisfaction of its superior claim.121 Thus, to permit a
unilateral inquiry by a fiduciary would not, as the Tax Court con-
tended, "entirely nullify" the effect of the priority statutes, although
it would, of course, seriously affect the ability of the United States
to collect its debts, since it is unquestionably more difficult and
costly for the Government to .pursue its claims against many persons
rather than one. However, a sound analysis of the problem should
balance this practical hardship on the United States against the harsh
result of imposing personal liability upon a fiduciary who may not
have "acted dishonestly in any way [nor] .. .positively intended
to thwart the Government's claim."'1 22 A fiduciary with knowledge
of a potential but unasserted government claim should not be subject
to personal liability under the priority statute unless it can be
shown that he acted unreasonably under the circumstances. As-
suming arguendo that a fiduciary has an obligation under section
8467 with regard to unasserted claims,123 he should be required, un-
der a reasonableness test, to check the records of the decedent or in-
solvent to determine whether there is any substance to the potential
government claim. If a fiduciary encounters a legal question in
ascertaining if the facts indicate a valid federal claim, he should be
entitled to rely on the advice of competent counsel. Once he has
made a reasonable investigation of the relevant records, and, if
necessary, consulted legal counsel, a fiduciary should not be required
to ask the Government whether it intends to assert the potential
claim in the future.
CONCLUSION
When the federal priority statutes were first enacted and earliest
interpreted, individuals had few direct relations with the Govern-
ment and, hence, little opportunity to become indebted to it. How-
ever, with the increasing proliferation of federal agencies which
have contractual and statutory relations with many individuals and
121 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6901 (a) (1) (A), 6322, 6323. See generally Annot.,
94 A.L.R.2d 748 (1964). There is some question whether the Government can trace
the proceeds of a wrongful distribution into the hands of innocent distributees in
cases not involving taxes on a constructive trust fund theory. Compare United States
v. Anderson, 66 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1946), and United States v. Fisher, 57 F. Supp.
410 (E.D. Mich. 1944), with United States v. Vibradamp Corp., 257 F. Supp. 931,
937-38 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
'12 King v. United States, 379 U.S. 829, 839 (1964).
'1' See notes 107-08 supra and accompanying text.
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corporations, and with the imposition of a pervasive and far-reaching
federal tax structure, a fiduciary must act with extreme care and
clear direction, if he is to avoid unexpected personal liability under
the priority statutes. The courts have generally provided the
fiduciary with adequate guidance for determining most of the issues
that may confront him, such as the types of representatives, claims,
debtors, and competing obligations to which the statutes apply.
Nevertheless, because the United States is not required to submit a
formal claim against the assets of a decedent, as are other creditors
in probate and bankruptcy proceedings, the potential for injustice
exists under the personal liability provisions of section 3467.124 This
is especially true, if as some courts have held,125 a fiduciary merely
chargeable with knowledge of a potential and unasserted govern-
ment claim is required to pursue a unilateral inquiry as to the actual
existence of such a claim at his peril. In order to eliminate the
possibility for injustice, and to facilitate the expeditious disposition
of decedents' and debtors' estates, it is suggested that Congress clarify
the degree of notice required for the imposition of personal liability
under section 3467 of the federal priority statutes. If notice of un-
asserted claims is made sufficient, the fiduciary should only be re-
quired to act in a reasonable manner in ascertaining the merits of
the claim and should not be required to seek a federal determination
of the claim.
2212 Several courts have indicated that they recognize the potential for injustice in-
herent in such a rule. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611, 635
(1948) (dissenting opinion); United States v. Barnes, 31 F. 705, 709 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
125 See notes 115-17 supra and accompanying text.
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